Rebuilding U.S.-China Relations for International Transparency and Civil Rights
My grandparents grew up in Communist China. What they carried out of it was a habit of understanding which opinions to voice and which to suppress. The impact and implementation of government censorship goes beyond the initial event of political opposition or unrest, which is why a state's treatment of dissent cannot be judged only at the moment of confrontation.
In the spring of 1989, that moment came to Beijing. Students gathered in Tiananmen Square on April 15 to mourn Hu Yaobang, a reformist party chief forced out in 1987, and the mourning became a forum of grievances for Chinese youth that protested political and economic injustices: inflation was nearing 30 percent in 1988, government officials were corrupted by the nepotism in the Party leadership. [1][2][3] The Chinese government declared Martial law on May 20, and on the night of June 3 and 4, the People's Liberation Army mobilized armed troops and vehicles to “clear” all protesters in Tiananmen Square.

The Red Cross Society of China estimates roughly 2,700 died, although in official government reports a mere 241. A British diplomatic cable declassified in 2017 recorded a minimum estimate of 10,000 civilian dead. [4][5] Amnesty International's assessment, thousands killed and tens of thousands arrested, remains the responsible summary. [6]
That disagreement is the finding. Decades in the aftermath of this event, no one can say how many the Chinese state killed, with most sources being a massive underreporting and the state never permitting discourse by historians or researchers.
Democracies are not defined by restraint or opposition at the barricade; countless western democracies have responded to political protests with state-sponsored retaliation . What distinguishes them are the actions taken afterward: courts, subpoenas, independent journalists, inquiries that have the freedom to contradict the government. The Chinese government stripped that process from their people following the Tiananmen protests, and the clearest evidence is in the state’s policy regarding law enforcement and policing.
The People’s Armed Police (PAP) was created to spare the military from domestic policing, but its failure in 1989 forced a military deployment that severely damaged China’s foreign relations.[7] The Party's answer was not to liberalize protest policing but to expand development for it. The PAP was enlarged and given riot units; a 1995 directive centralized its personnel under the Central Military Commission; fourteen PLA divisions were consolidated as mobile contingents. [7][8] In 2018, the State Council’s line of command to the PAP was cut altogether, leaving their leadership solely dependent on the Party's military commission. [7] The logic is simple: Party leadership never wants to use the army on its own streets again, and therefore, strengthening law enforcement protocol and disciplinary forces resolves the problem of rioters and protesters altogether. [9]

In comparison to the American system, where police power is scattered across thousands of agencies answering to elected mayors, sheriffs, and councils, and exposed to civil rights litigation and congressional oversight. That fragmented system is what allows citizens to be able to contest actions and policies from law enforcement. In China, that channel allowing for civil discourse was closed by design. It is not the absence of political opposition that distinguishes an American or Chinese system, but rather the contestability of their institutions.
Within the international community, allies suspended diplomacy visits, aid, and export credits, the World Bank halted lending, and the European Community imposed an arms embargo [27][28]. The Party conceded some favors in response to Western countries’ backlash. Beijing acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992, signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996, and signed (but never enacted) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1998. [10][11] The asymmetry is the tell: treaties limiting China's weapons were ratified, while the one limiting the Party's conduct toward its own citizens was signed then abandoned. China is still the only UN Security Council permanent member that is not an ICCPR party. [12]
Here Vaclav Havel's contribution was tactical as well as moral. Charter 08, published in December 2008 with 303 initial signatories, was modeled on Charter 77 and, like its predecessor, demanded compliance in a modest manner utilizing China's own constitution and with the UN instruments China had signed. [15][16] Havel called Liu Xiaobo's sentence shameful in a January 2010 letter to Hu Jintao, then joined Desmond Tutu and the Dalai Lama in nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize. [17][18]

However, those signatures of the 2010s have increasingly lost meaning and value in the recent decade. Freedom House scored China 9 out of 100 on internet freedom in 2025, among the world's worst, citing provincial censorship above the national firewall and more than a million “anti-government” posts removed in one early-2025 sweep. [19][20] In 2026, federal authorities barred families of the Tiananmen Massacre victims from visiting cemeteries for the first time; the Tiananmen Mothers' appeal that year carried 107 signatures. [21]
For the United States, implementing policy changes to reform China’s approach to law enforcement must be approached with an understanding of the countries’ relationship historically. Executive Order 12850 previously conditioned China's most-favored-nation status on human rights progress, while on May 26, 1994, President Clinton announced that the conditions had not been met for China to hold that title. [22][23] The reversal failed miserably, as it set a precedent for Chinese lawmakers that any American leverage for civil rights runs through a single office and can be outwaited. Therefore, any policy recommendation that cannot survive a change in presidential administrations will be viewed as ineffective.
First, legislate the record. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China's Political Prisoner Database holds 11,262 records, 2,755 of them being active detentions. [24] Congress should make the database, as well as an annual State Department certification of which cases were raised and which drew a national response, a permanent statutory requirement rather than a discretionary practice.
Second, restore quiet, case-specific asks. Since 1999 the Dui Hua Foundation has submitted more than 500 prisoner lists and obtained written responses on over 1,000 individuals, with clemency in many cases, though Chinese ministries have grown more resistant to communication and transparency. [25][26] Making this list exchange a standing item in every channel of discussion and revision, rather than a one-time summit deliverable, would ultimately raise the cost of the government’s refusal or resistance.
Third, ask for compliance on what China has already signed. ICCPR ratification has been urged by dozens of states across successive reviews. [12] The U.S. should treat it as a necessary sequenced measure rather than symbolic–either in the form of a ratification with reservations, or working steps such as publishing aggregate detention statistics and admitting the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Each is defensible for the Chinese government to enact, being framed as honoring a prior commitment rather than yielding to American pressure. The ICCPR ratification has been coordinated by countries with existing dialogues with China, such as the European Union, Canada, Australia, and Japan.
Although these policies do not free Chinese prisoners on its own, finding recommendations that stay feasible for decades to come and do not rely on one presidential administration’s conditions will ultimately lead to a more stable outcome in the international community.
Havel understood that every commitment and policy a government signs becomes a claim its citizens can press. China's record since 1989 can not be viewed as a simple retreat from democratic norms. It has been a sophisticated project to accumulate and agree to international commitments while dismantling every domestic mechanism capable of enforcing them. American policy regarding their relationship with China should be built to address that gap. My grandparents learned which opinions to voice and which to suppress. A state is measured by whether the suppressed ones can still be spoken, and whether anyone remains free to record them.
Jane Wang is an undergraduate student at Cornell University studying public policy. She conducts research for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in the immigration sector with a focus on Asian-American history and rights.
This article was submitted to the Security and Democracy Forum’s Václav Havel Emerging Voices in Democracy Writing Competition and was selected for an Honorable Mention.
SOURCES
[1] U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "Tiananmen Square, 1989," Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/tiananmen-square
[2] Reuters, "China's Tiananmen Square Demonstrations and Crackdown," June 4, 2025 (chronology; 1988 inflation approaching 30 percent).
[3] Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Tiananmen Square Incident," updated June 4, 2026 (Hu Yaobang's 1987 removal; April 26 People's Daily editorial). https://www.britannica.com/event/Tiananmen-Square-incident
[4] Kris Cheng, "Declassified: Chinese Official Said at Least 10,000 Civilians Died in 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, Documents Show," Hong Kong Free Press, December 21, 2017 (UK National Archives cable of Ambassador Alan Donald, June 5, 1989). https://hongkongfp.com/2017/12/21/declassified-chinese-official-said-least-10000-civilians-died-1989-tiananmen-massacre-documents-show/
[5] Anthony Tao, "No, 10,000 Were Not Killed in China's 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown," The China Project, December 25, 2017 (scholarly dissent from the 10,000 figure). https://thechinaproject.com/2017/12/25/no-10000-not-killed-in-tiananmen-crackdown/
[6] Amnesty International, "The 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown," 2025-2026 campaign page. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2025/05/what-is-the-tiananmen-crackdown/
[7] Joel Wuthnow, "The Re-conquerors of Hong Kong? A Primer on China's People's Armed Police," War on the Rocks, August 2019 (PAP origins, 1989 failure, PLA division transfers, 2018 command reform). https://warontherocks.com/the-re-conquerors-of-hong-kong-a-primer-on-chinas-peoples-armed-police/
[8] Joel Wuthnow, "China's Other Army: The People's Armed Police in an Era of Reform," Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, China Strategic Perspectives No. 14 (March 1995 State Council and CMC directive on PAP personnel management). https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/82/China%20SP%2014%20Final%20for%20Web.pdf
[9] Larry Wortzel, "The Tiananmen Massacre Remembered at 30 Years: The Chinese Communist Party's Political and Military Considerations," The Jamestown Foundation, China Brief. https://jamestown.org/the-tiananmen-massacre-remembered-at-30-years-the-chinese-communist-partys-political-and-military-considerations/
[10] Arms Control Association, "Timeline of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)" (China acceded 1992). https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-the-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT
[11] Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, "Status of Signature and Ratification" (China signed 1996). https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification/
[12] Human Rights Watch, "China: Ratify Key International Human Rights Treaty," October 8, 2013 (ICCPR signed October 5, 1998; China the only P5 non-party); Human Rights in China, "UN Treaty Bodies and China" (interim good-faith obligation; ICCPR ratification the most widely advanced UPR topic). https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/08/china-ratify-key-international-human-rights-treaty
[13] Uyghur Human Rights Project and 15 partner organizations, joint statement, June 25, 2024 (China accepted 290 of 428 UPR recommendations, partially accepted 8, noted 32, rejected 98). https://uhrp.org/statement/chinese-government-rejects-key-human-rights-recommendations-in-latest-un-review/
[14] International Service for Human Rights, "Latest UN Review Displays China's Disregard for Human Rights, UN Findings," July 2024 (rejection rate near 30 percent, up from 18 percent in 2018). https://ishr.ch/latest-updates/latest-un-review-displays-chinas-disregard-for-human-rights-un-findings/
[15] Feng Chongyi, "Charter 08 Framer Liu Xiaobo Awarded Nobel Peace Prize: The Troubled History and Future of Chinese Liberalism," The Asia-Pacific Journal (Charter 08 modeled on Charter 77 and on the PRC constitution and UN instruments). https://apjjf.org/feng-chongyi/3285/article
[16] Vaclav Havel, Xu Youyu, and Cui Weiping, "Remarks at the Ceremony for the Homo Homini Award," The New York Review of Books, April 30, 2009 (Charter 08 as a demand for compliance with existing obligations). https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2009/04/30/remarks-by-vaclav-havel-and-two-members-of-chinas/
[17] "Vaclav Havel (1936-2011)," Journal of Democracy 23, no. 2 (April 2012): 182 (January 6, 2010 open letter to Hu Jintao; Nobel nomination with Desmond Tutu and the Dalai Lama). https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/vaclav-havel-1936-2011/
[18] Norwegian Nobel Committee, "The Nobel Peace Prize 2010: Statements," NobelPrize.org (award to Liu Xiaobo; empty chair at the Oslo ceremony). https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2010/statement/
[19] Freedom House, "China: Freedom on the Net 2025 Country Report" (score of 9/100; Cyberspace Administration of China removal figures). https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-net/2025
[20] Freedom House, "Freedom on the Net 2025: An Uncertain Future for the Global Internet" (China and Myanmar tied as worst environments; provincial blocking above the Great Firewall). https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2025/uncertain-future-global-internet
[21] Associated Press via PBS News, "Police Warn Families of Tiananmen Crackdown Dead Not to Visit Graves on 37th Anniversary," June 4, 2026 (Tiananmen Mothers appeal signed by 107 people). https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/police-warn-families-of-tiananmen-crackdown-dead-not-to-visit-graves-on-37th-anniversary
[22] Congressional Research Service, "China-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Developments During the Clinton Administration," Report 97-484 (Executive Order 12850; May 26, 1994 delinkage). https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/97-484.html
[23] USC U.S.-China Institute, "President Clinton Press Conference on Human Rights in China," May 26, 1994 (Clinton's acknowledgment that the executive order's conditions were not fully met). https://china.usc.edu/node/19958
[24] Congressional-Executive Commission on China, "Chairs Release 2025 Annual Report," December 2025 (Political Prisoner Database: 11,262 records, 2,755 active detentions). https://www.cecc.gov/media-center/press-releases/chairs-release-2025-annual-report
[25] The Dui Hua Foundation, "Who We Are" and "Our Focus" (founded 1999; 500th prisoner list submitted; role of lists in bilateral human rights dialogues). https://duihua.org/who-we-are/
[26] The Dui Hua Foundation, "Dialogue Issue 29: China's Global Presence Shifts Dialogue Away from Domestic Rights Abuses" (responses on more than 1,000 prisoners; growing ministerial resistance to lists). https://duihua.org/dialogue-issue-29-chinas-global-presence-shifts-dialogue-away-from-domestic-rights-abuses/




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