The Real Threat to European Democracy Isn’t Brussels

A Swiss politician recently described a prospective package of bilateral accords between Switzerland and the European Union as an “introduction of foreign law, foreign judges and arbitrary sanctions […] tantamount to colonial subjugation.” Even though Switzerland is not an EU member and these accords will be subject to a popular vote, the European Union is frequently accused of eroding democracy and individual freedoms.

This criticism misses the real threat. The most direct and violent attack on democracy in Europe today does not come from Brussels, but from Vladimir Putin's Russia. Through military aggression and occupation, Moscow has already dismantled democratic institutions in Ukraine and shows little sign of stopping there.

Therefore, instead of trying to counter “anti‑EU” narratives from within, the European Union should reorganize the tools it already has and use them to confront autocracy on its borders. Politically and militarily, the EU is not starting from zero. It already possesses decision‑making bodies, military command structures, and long‑term defense coordination mechanisms designed for crisis response. On the ground, the most relevant of these tools are the EU Battlegroups: roughly 1,500‑strong, multinational forces created for rapid deployment in crises ranging from stabilization missions to peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions. Unlike larger formations such as Eurocorps, the Battlegroups operate under full EU political control, making them the Union’s most direct instrument of action.

Concretely, the EU should follow a 3-step approach, which will ultimately create a positive feedback loop.

The first step is to change the way the European Council deploys Battlegroups. As of today, any deployment decision must be unanimous, meaning that a single Member State can block a potentially valuable deployment of EU Battlegroups. This calls for an urgent change: the Council should adopt qualified majority voting, which is reached when 55% of the Member States, representing at least 65% of the total EU population, agree (and which is already the most widely used voting method in the Council).

The following step involves the EU finally deploying the Battlegroups. It is highly problematic that they were fully operational by 2007 but have not been deployed even once. By finally testing the Battlegroups, their structure and their command and control, the EU would gain precious insights on the ground and for future deployments. Examples of deployments could include Ukraine or the Baltics; the Battlegroups’ mission is broad (“conflict prevention, initial stabilization, humanitarian interventions and rescue tasks, crisis management, peacekeeping") and should be tested accordingly.

Finally, the lessons learned from deployments must be considered, processed, and communicated “down the chain” after political discussions and approval. Only in this way will the EU be able to gradually expand its footprint, gain valuable experience, refine its structure, and become a more efficient force for good.

The EU has no other choice but to step up and assume greater responsibility for its own security. On the one hand, the United States has demonstrated that the European theatre is no longer its priority, and the latest troop reduction is just one example. On the other hand, it is also normal and understandable to expect Europeans to take care of their own security. Finally, as Josep Borrell said, the EU must learn to “use the language of power”: while the EU is an economic and soft power, it will also need to coordinate (and use) its “hard” power to remain relevant.

The EU should follow this course of action because it has all the necessary tools: financial and human resources, as well as a large number of uniformed personnel. The only thing to do is to coordinate, learn, make mistakes, and try again. Furthermore, the goal is clear, necessary, and entirely in line with EU values: to defend human rights, the rule of law, and democracy. Finally, such an initiative would provide impetus and momentum to the broader European project, which, especially in a period of renewed zero-sum competition and isolationism, would be a welcome change.

Critics would argue that national defense is too closely guarded by the Member States or too complex to integrate supranationally. Others may dismiss this as a technocratic unity exercise detached from public opinion. Indeed, the EU is not beyond criticism, and Brussels has sometimes overreached or communicated poorly. But administrative overreach and bureaucratic frustration are categorically different from military aggression, occupation, and the systemic destruction of democratic institutions. Furthermore, collective defense has historically been one of the most tangible ways in which European integration becomes visible and meaningful to citizens.

Other skeptics might say that nobody will “die for the EU”, this remote institution in Brussels that few people really know. However, European soldiers already serve to protect their populations, territory, and way of life. The argument here is that doing so together, under a European framework, is safer and more credible than doing so alone: Member States alone would struggle against Russia, but their collective strength would stand a better chance.

For those worried about Russia, testing the Battlegroups does not mean reckless escalation. Initial deployments would be limited in scope, mandate, and duration, designed to test command, logistics, and political decision-making rather than to fight large-scale wars.

Finally, some will argue that this responsibility belongs to NATO, not the EU. NATO remains indispensable, but it is not a substitute for European political agency. The alliance depends heavily on US leadership, and its credibility fluctuates with American domestic politics. An EU capable of acting militarily would not weaken NATO; it would strengthen it by reducing dependency and increasing European reliability.

The EU was founded on the principles of democracy, the rule of law, freedom, and the commitment “never again” to war and tyranny. Now, these two evils are back: first in Ukraine, they might spill over into the Baltics and ultimately could destroy (or at least divide) the European idea and project. The EU is not a dictatorship: it is a necessary institution that has all the tools it needs to fight and prevail against one.

Roc Iore graduated from the George Washington University with a M.A. in International Affairs. He holds a B.A. in Public Policy from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich (Switzerland), which was part of his training as a career officer of the Swiss Army. During his studies, he was also the vice-president of the Young European Swiss, the youth section of the European Movement Switzerland. Among other tasks, he wrote the organization’s position paper on the amended EU-Weapons Directive (which the Swiss electorate approved in May 2019) and organized a one-week trip to visit several European institutions in Belgium, France, and Luxembourg. After over 10 years as a career officer, he joined the Federal Office for Defense Procurement, where he worked on acquisition projects for the Swiss Army.