The Role of Institutions for Environmental Security

Studies have shown that environmental stresses are increasingly correlated with conflicts. Miguel et al. (2004) posit that economic growth is strongly negatively correlated with civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, with rainfall being an exogenic instrumental variable for economic growth. Another study by Ash and Obradovich (2020) found that climate-induced internal migration led to increased political instability in Syria, which exploded into the Syrian Civil War in 2011.

Environmental stresses can lead to increased scarcity of natural resources, and increased competition over those resources can cause conflicts. This is especially true for common pool resources (CPR), which are resources that are non-excludable but rivalrous, meaning that nobody can be prevented from using the resource but the use of it takes away from the ability of others to use. Examples of CPRs include water (both groundwater and surface water), land, and fisheries. CPRs are prone to the tragedy of the commons, in which the resource is overused and thus depleted. 

A key example of how increased pressures on a CPR can lead to conflict is increased violence between farmers and herders in Nigeria. Climate change is shrinking the available amount of pastureland and explosive population growth means that more people are using the available pastureland. That has caused the land available for farming to overlap with the land available for herding, leading to increased interaction between the two groups. Since farmers and herders have different interests for their land, conflicts can arise between the two group due to disagreements over land management. That has resulted in over 2,000 fatalities related to farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria in 2018 (Brottem 2021). 

Previous “solutions” to the tragedy of the commons associated with CPRs include central planning through government and privatization. However, those “solutions” fail to account for the lack of knowledge of central planners and changing conditions affecting the resource. In fact, the Nigerian government tried to prevent further farmer-herder conflicts by passing anti-open grazing laws that alienated herder communities even more. Elinor Ostrom (1990) demonstrates that the users of CPRs can organize themselves to come up with the socially optimal management of those resources. Ostrom shows that in order for that to occur, eight conditions must be met. Those conditions are the following:

1. Commons need to have well-defined boundaries.

2. Rules should fit local circumstances.

3. Participatory decision-making is vital.

4. Commons must be monitored.

5. Sanctions for those who abuse the commons should be graduated.

6. Conflict resolution should be easily accessible.

7. Commons need the right to organize.

8. Commons work best when nested within larger networks.

An example of the successful governance of a CPR is the collective management of the inshore fishery in Alanya, Turkey in the 1970s. When the fishery was starting to become depleted, conflicts occasionally broke out among the fishers. But the locals were able to work together to devise a system that would allow every user an equitable share of the fishery. All usable fishing locations were marked, and every year, the initial sites were randomly assigned to users. The fishers would move one spot to the east each day, to ensure that all fishers would have an equal chance of fishing at the best spot. After four months, the fishers would change directions and rotate one spot to the west every day, to account for the changing migration patterns of the fish.

This equitable management of the Alanya fishery was made possible because it met many of the eight conditions listed above. The arrangement ensured the risk of conflict decreased because the rights to the fishery are well-defined. Every user of the fishery has an equal chance of getting the best fishing spot at least once per season, decreasing the chance someone will create conflict by trying to steal a good fishing spot on any given day. 

The key to ensuring these conditions are robust institutions and a healthy democracy. Robust institutions lead to greater social trust, so that individuals in a community can work together to devise the best way to manage CPRs. A healthy democracy is essential because local communities must have the freedom to make independent decisions to manage CPRs. The arrangement at Alanya worked because it was devised by the people who used the fishery and had the support of the local cooperative, which about half of the local fishers belonged to. The trust in the cooperative and the ability for the users to freely govern themselves without state interference were essential in the efficient governance of the Alanya fishery.

In an era characterized by eroding trust in democratic institutions globally, it is important to consider the indirect role those institutions play in preventing environmental conflict. Robust democratic institutions are essential for the sound management of CPRs. By ensuring the fair allocation of CPRs to community members, these institutions serve to prevent conflict among groups that might otherwise compete for the same limited resources. Environmental stresses can trigger conflicts, but the efficient management of CPRs aided by robust institutions and a healthy democracy can prevent those conflicts from occurring.

Bryan Fok has conducted extensive research on environmental security and international development issues. He has worked as a research assistant with the Kellogg Institute for International Studies and the Sagamore Institute. He is currently a research assistant with APPRISE and is a recent graduate from the University of Notre Dame.

Works Cited

Ash, Konstantin, and Nick Obradovich. 2020. “Climatic Stress, Internal Migration, and Syrian Civil War Onset.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 64(1): 3-31. 

Brottem, Leif. 2021. “The Growing Complexity of Farmer-Herder Conflict in West and Central Africa.” Africa Security Brief 39. https://africacenter.org/publication/growing-complexity-farmer-herder-conflict-west-central-africa/. 

Miguel, Edward, Shankar Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti. 2004. “Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 112(4): 725-753.

Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.