Debunking the Myth of Russian Invincibility

Photo: Alex Fedorenko via Unsplash

Introduction

Russia is not the military juggernaut it claims to be. The West must shed outdated fears and recognize that Moscow is bleeding men and material for minimal gains. Since February 24, 2022, Russia has suffered over one million casualties to occupy less than 12% of Ukrainian territory. Far from capturing Kyiv in 72 hours, Russian forces have failed to achieve a decisive breakthrough. Yet the Kremlin projects strength: in March 2025, President Putin declared his troops were “set to finish” Ukraine; on August 29, Defense Minister Belousov claimed forces captured 600–700 km² per month; and on August 30, Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov announced a “non-stop offensive” and insisted Russia holds the “strategic initiative.” Believing these boasts sustains the myth of Russian supremacy, distorting strategy and constraining Western support for Ukraine.

Historical Myth-Making

Russia cultivates an aura of military invincibility, yet its record shows consistent patterns: it prevails with Western support, dominates weaker foes, or falters against capable, especially Western-backed, adversaries.

Russia’s most celebrated victory—World War II—relied on massive Allied aid. Historian James Holland notes that shipments of trucks, tanks, planes, fuel, and raw materials enabled the Red Army’s decisive victories at Stalingrad and Kursk and allowed the USSR to move its manufacturing east of the Urals.

By contrast, Russia’s more independent victories came largely against significantly weaker opponents. Soviet interventions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), as well as later Russian campaigns in Chechnya (1999–2009) and Georgia (2008), relied on overwhelming force rather than battlefield skill.

Against capable adversaries, Russia often failed. Defeats in the Russo-Japanese War, World War I, and the Polish-Soviet War exposed deep structural weaknesses. The Soviet-Afghan War—fought against American-backed insurgents—hastened the USSR’s collapse.

Today, Russia’s aura of invincibility faces its hardest test. Many Western policymakers expected Kyiv to fall within days in February 2022. In reality, for the first time in decades, Russia is fighting a peer opponent—and it is faltering. Yet the myth persists.

Casualties vs. Minimal Gains

Staggering casualties, equipment losses, minimal gains, and declining combat effectiveness expose the myth of Russian invincibility. For the West, these realities offer both an opportunity and a warning: policy must follow battlefield facts, not decades-old myths.

The Institute for the Study of War notes that Kremlin statements exaggerate Russia’s position and obscure casualties: advances often come in “open fields with minimal fortifications, through failed infiltration operations … at heavy personnel losses.” Although Moscow does not publish reliable casualty figures, outside observers note Ukraine has exacted a staggering toll: over one million Russian troops killed or wounded since February 2022, with annual losses rising yearly—estimated at 105,960 in 2022, 252,940 in 2023, and 429,660 in 2024. Current estimates suggest Russia loses over 900 troops daily. Independent outlets Meduza and Mediazona identified roughly 220,000 confirmed deaths using Russia’s National Probate Registry. The Center for Strategic and International Studies reports Russia has suffered roughly five times as many casualties in Ukraine as in all Soviet and Russian conflicts since 1945.

Materiel losses are severe and compound the problem. Thousands of tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery have been destroyed, with production struggling to keep pace. By April 2025, over 4,000 tanks had been lost, and the high cost and vulnerability of armored vehicles to Ukrainian drones has prompted a shift toward cheaper vehicles—motorcycles and buggies—while tank and armored vehicle stocks continue to decline.

Territorial gains tell a similar story. Most of Russia’s current holdings were captured in the invasion’s opening months. Since then, frontlines have barely moved. Russian “human-wave attacks” have had minimal strategic impact, and over the past three years, Russia has actually lost territory (19.23% of Ukraine on September 29, 2022, versus 19.04% on September 29, 2025) while sustaining nearly one million casualties.

Despite some advances, Russian technical improvements, such as drone production and usage, remain uneven and poorly distributed. General Christopher Cavoli, Commander of U.S. European Command, notes Russian combat quality continues to erode, while Ukrainian forces grow more capable. This widening gap makes even modest Russian gains costly, fragile, and unsustainable.

Western Self-Deterrence

Russia’s failures should embolden the West, yet too many leaders still treat Russia as omnipotent, fear escalation and overestimate Moscow’s capacity.

This self-deterrence carries real costs and spans administrations. It slows weapons deliveries while imposing restrictions that not only signal Western risk-aversion but also embolden Russia.While President Biden recognized Putin’s war as part of a broader campaign against the West and rallied domestic and international support for Ukraine, U.S. aid still came with limits. The most notable was the ban on strikes inside Russia until November 2024, when North Korean troops deployed to assist Moscow. These restrictions reflected exaggerated fears of Russian escalation.

President Trump sharply departed from Biden’s approach and echoed the myth, telling President Zelensky in February 2025, “You don’t have the cards.” While Biden’s policy—sometimes criticized as overly cautious—demonstrated Western resolve, Trump pursued rapprochement with Putin and direct negotiations to end the war. These efforts failed: the August 2025 Alaska summit ended without the desired ceasefire, and a subsequent meeting with Trump, Zelensky, and European leaders produced no meaningful security guarantees. These failures emboldened the Kremlin, which responded with its largest drone attack to date on September 7—over 800 drones and 13 missiles—while escalating NATO provocations in Poland, Romania, and Estonia.

At the September 2025 UN General Assembly, Trump suggested Ukraine could “fight and WIN all of Ukraine back” with EU support, citing his new grasp of the military and economic situation. Yet he shifted responsibility to NATO and Europe, pledging only that Washington would “continue” supplying weapons “for NATO to do what they want with them.” He also urged NATO allies to shoot down Russian aircraft that enter NATO airspace but stopped short of pledging American assistance. Meanwhile, his administration reportedly plans major cuts to NATO’s eastern flank security programs. President Trump’s rhetoric hinted at a shift, but its practical impact remains uncertain.

While possible shifts in thinking are welcome, Kremlin officials continue exploiting Western hesitation, inflating modest gains into proof of “strategic initiative.” The recent drone attacks and NATO airspace violations are clear examples of this dynamic: Russia converts Western restraint into propaganda victories, reinforcing continued caution. The feedback loop—propaganda breeds fear, fear shapes policy—has limited Ukraine’s access to the tools it needs. The battlefield, however, shows otherwise: Ukraine continues to exploit Russia’s vulnerabilities. If the West sheds outdated fears, it can shift the battlefield, pressure Moscow, and accelerate Ukrainian momentum.

Policy Implications

Russia is hemorrhaging troops, losing vast quantities of equipment, and failing to achieve decisive victories. Aid and strategy should reflect these realities—not outdated fears. The West should:

•  Recognize that Russia exaggerates its strength;

• Provide Ukraine with the tools for deep strikes and sustained campaigns that exploit Russian weaknesses; and

• Incorporate realistic assessments of Russian capabilities into deterrence planning, escalation management, and strategic messaging.

By acting on reality rather than on myth, the West can maximize Ukraine’s leverage, degrade Russian capacity, and shorten the conflict on terms favorable to Kyiv. Grounding aid, deterrence, and policy on this basis empowers Ukraine to exploit Russian weaknesses and maintain the international rules-based order.